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ABSTRACT. How do we, as scholars – social scientists and historians – respond to 
momentous contemporary events? Our instincts urge caution, but the events demand 
action. While blogs and other media offer some paths, they can veer too much 
towards the snap judgments associated with bad journalism and simplistic represen- 
tation. This paper consists of two essays, one embedded in the other, that challenge 
us to think differently about news, social science, and history. The impetus comes 
from an attempt to make sense of the first, muddled weeks of the new Trump 
administration in Washington. With reference to Foucault’s concept of govern- 
mentality, it reflects on how the CEO-in-Chief at the White House seemed to invoke 
a form of pre-modern governance, reminiscent of the divine right of kings and echo- 
ing a case in the not-too-distant past of a lapse in corporate governance. The main 
essay then resumes to consider what this means about academic writing and publish- 
ing, and what it might mean in terms of new forms of scholarly communication and 
impact about current affairs, as the first, rough draft of history passes into and 
through a second.  
 
Keywords: draft; history; Trump; Foucault; pre-modern governance; event 
 
 
How to cite: Nordberg, Donald (2017), “First and Second Drafts of History: The Case of 
Trump, Foucault and Pre-modern Governance,” Geopolitics, History, and International 
Relations 9(2): 107–117.  
 
 
Received 29 March 2017 • Received in revised form 21 May 2017 
Accepted 21 May 2017 • Available online 10 June 2017 
 
First and Second Drafts of History 
 
How do we as scholars react to momentous contemporary events? As social 
scientists, we see important developments in motion, changes in society that 
might benefit from thoughtful reflection and cogent argumentation. In short, 
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we might have a chance to say something – do something – with real impact. 
As historians, we might set those events in context, providing a firmer per- 
spective than we see in the rapid-fire of non-stop news media. Their quick-
draw metaphors must, perforce, escalate with each news cycle, until they must, 
perforce, overstate the case. But we scholars have developed an instinct for 
rigor; we hesitate before claiming to understand the whole when looking at 
only a small part of the picture, which militates against timely decisions. 
And our medium for communication – the academic essay, peer reviewed 
and thus desiccated, depersonalized, homogenized – seems particularly ill-
suited to the task.  
Let us take a look at an essay – as in the French, un essai, an attempt – 
that seeks to make sense of the momentous events in Washington at the start 
of the Trump administration. It asks us to consider Trump as CEO, and then 
to look through Foucault’s eyes at how the divine right of kings gave way to 
the administrative state of the modern era, setting the stage for democratic 
governance. By comparing Trump to a case of not-quite-so-contemporary 
corporate governance – News Corporation and Rupert Murdoch – it suggests 
some tentative conclusions that add the perspective of social science and 
history to current affairs, though without making a claim of conviction.  
 
The Case of Trump, Foucault and Pre-modern Governance 
 
“No one ever accused this company of being a democracy!” – Private com- 
ment of a CEO of a major multinational corporation, overheard ca. 1990 
 
This quote came to mind as I read the news about one of Donald J. Trump’s 
executive orders, signed in Week 1 of his Presidency of the United States. On 
the first full day in the office, the CEO-in-the-White-House invited a group 
of CEOs of major US corporations to discuss the future governance of Amer- 
ica. CEOs have been practising corporate governance forever, and must 
know a thing or two about it. By the end of the meeting, surely they knew a 
lot more, because they were there to learn from each other, and from Trump.  
The Economist magazine, in its extended “Briefing” item the following 
week, said Trump’s advisers believe that he has “a mandate to blow up norms 
of good governance” (The Economist, 2017). Let us explore, then, what 
governance means.  
Trump’s ban on arrivals of citizens of seven, mainly Muslim states was 
one of those executive orders, though it was quickly, if temporarily, set aside 
by the courts. Petulantly, like a CEO annoyed by an underling, Trump ranted 
(a more accurate description than the sweet-sounding “tweeted”) against the 
judges who dared to defy him. Was he not the Leader of the Free World, as 
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the “lying press” he despised kept telling us he was? Was he not President of 
the first democracy of the modern era, carrying out the will of the people?  
This vignette brings to mind another line of thought about governance. In 
the late 1970s, the French sociologist Michel Foucault delivered a series of 
lectures at the Collège de France, on security, territory and population 
(Foucault, 2009). In one of them he reflected on the term “governmentality,” 
a neologism without clear definition.  
Foucault’s puzzle was this: What led the people of Europe, with their 
broad acceptance during the Renaissance of the divine right of kings, to 
embrace an entirely different form of governance? The new one was based on 
the power of central administration and guided, at least in part, by dispas- 
sionate and rational processes, and not the whims of a monarch. He talked of 
the sense of order implicit in Machiavelli’s Prince, where what the choice is 
right leads to actions that can sustain popular faith in the ruler’s absolute 
authority, even without agreement in the rightness of the decision. But other 
decisions might destroy that faith.  
In the later period, faith transferred to the state, the apparatus of bureau- 
cracy, and emerging “technologies” of governance. The word “govern- 
mentality” sounded at once like a mentality of governance and the ability to 
reconceive government.  
What happened between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment was, of 
course, the Thirty Years’ War. It lasted most of the first half of the 17th Cen- 
tury. An estimated eight million people died, among them nearly a third of 
the population of the German states and principalities. Protestants and 
Catholics slaughtered each other over articles of faith, which had disguised 
the territorial ambitions of kings and princes.  
Its horror failed to destroy faith in God – we would have to wait until 
after the Second World War for that to spread through Europe. But it sapped 
support for monarchies. Their popular legitimacy waned, unleashing a 
fervent desire for an age of reason, which Toulmin (1992) describes and then 
challenges so well. It also set the stage for the unenlightened, unreasoning of 
the French Revolution. Democratic at first, French revolutionists soon reverted 
to pre-modern barbarism, halted only when Napoleon Bonaparte declared 
himself Emperor, reasserted order in France, and conquered much of Europe.  
But before that, Modernism had ushered in an enlightened revolution, the 
American one, which established democracy, albeit in a limited way. The 
Constitution enfranchised the population broadly: initially only white and, in 
some places, property-owning males, before broadening after a barbarous 
Civil War threatened the country and Constitution. One political structure – 
the Electoral College – sought to block a rabble from electing populist 
demagogues as President. (Yes, I appreciate the irony.) By creating three co-
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equal branches of government it also constrained any President from being 
able to rule as if by divine right.  
Reading Foucault’s lecture in 2011, I reflected on the big news story of 
that time: The News of the World, a venerable British newspaper owned by 
Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp., and directed by his son James, had spent much 
effort and money hacking into the mobile phone messages of celebrities.  
The celebrities’ vociferous protests did little to halt the practice, but then 
the paper hacked the mobile phone of a child who had vanished and was 
feared dead. The journalists deleted the accumulating voicemails from her 
worried parents and friends, making room for more, but only after harvesting 
their content, names and phone numbers. In so doing, the journalists had – 
unwittingly or not, we can’t be sure – led the family and police to conclude 
the girl was still alive and, well, a runaway, not a victim.  
In the wake of a popular outcry, the Murdochs closed down the newspaper. 
A subsequent judicial inquiry laid out new and still disputed governance 
arrangements for the press (Petley, 2012). The controversy also saw the 
Murdochs appear before a British parliamentary committee, on what the 
elder Murdoch declared, ungrammatically, the “most humble day of my life” 
(The Guardian, 2011).  
Reflecting on their televised encounter, I came to see Rupert Murdoch as 
something of a Foucault-like version of Machiavelli’s prince. He seemed 
willful, self-absorbed and self-justifying, but at risk of forfeiting his “divine 
right” through clumsy slaughter of the source of his legitimacy: Journalism, 
while whimsical and often imperious and undemocratic, nonetheless performs 
a social good. Was this, then, a metaphor for CEOs in general? Isn’t 
corporate governance, after all, the attempt to pull corporations out of the 
pre-modern ways of working, into the modern?  
Fast forward to the White House on January 23, 2017. The collection of 
CEOs in Washington that day included the chiefs of Ford, Dell Computer, 
Fiat-Chrysler and a roomful of others, summoned there by CEO-cum-
President Trump. In a Foucauldian view, the assembled CEOs seemed like 
little princes, each sovereign in his own principality but obeisant. Their wills 
would be obeyed in their own territories, but they would obey, be sub- 
servient to, his will: America First.  
The end of the Thirty Years’ War marked beginning of what historians 
call the Modern Era. Modernism asserted a belief in rationality, a belief that 
truth could be found in science, not just religion, and, in Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality, a belief that the state, in whatever form it took, was there to 
serve the people, not the people to serve powerful but non-state rulers. The 
world of willful princes and absolute monarchs had disappeared, and 
Modernism flourished in statecraft, if not in corporate boardrooms.  
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Foucault was keenly aware of the limitations of Modernism. Its very 
rationalism had served as a tool to rationalize the slaughter of Jews under the 
Nazis, not to mention the eugenics practiced by Nazi sympathizers, and 
persecutions of minorities everywhere, including homosexuals, and the sup- 
pression of women.  
The world Foucault depicted was one of painful complexity and inter- 
dependence, one in which chains of command were technologies of discipline 
and freedom perhaps unachievable in any tangible sense. But let us recall 
that, in the view of historian Garry Wills, the intentions of Thomas Jefferson 
in drafting the Declaration of Independence were an assertion not so much of 
individual liberty, but rather of complexity and interdependence (Wills, 1978).  
Is Trump, in some sense, a post-modern President? This argument sug- 
gests he is not. It points instead to a reversion to pre-modern times. He has 
acted, at least, like the CEO of pre-modern corporate governance days, before 
the modernizing of the Cadbury Code (1992) in the UK sought to constrain 
“unfettered power” of CEOs. Its provisions to do so – by creating checks and 
balances in the boardroom along the lines of the US Constitution – were also 
recommended in US listing rules after Enron, WorldCom and many others 
failed  (Nasdaq, 2002; NYSE, 2003). 
The most successful CEOs are often imperious, of course. A case in point 
is Rupert Murdoch and his success in building a small Australian newspaper 
into the empire of global news, entertainment, book publishing, film and tele- 
vision we now know as News Corp. and 21st Century Fox. His case shows 
that the lack of external constraint, coupled with ambition, ideas and personal 
self-control can lead to superior outcomes.  
But the evidence is mixed (Boyd, 1995; Dalton & Dalton, 2011). Think 
of Jeffrey Skilling’s Enron, or Bernie Ebbers’ WorldCom. These counter-
examples recall that Machiavelli’s Prince was not so much an essay in praise 
of the Pre-modern as an anticipation of pragmatism and contingency.  
And public governance is different from corporate governance. Consider 
this: Markets in products and service, and particularly in capital, constrain the 
imperious CEO even when board structure and codes cannot. Shareholders 
can always sell and walk away. But there is only a very narrow market for 
nationalities and homelands. And, in the US, that market has just got smaller, 
by order of the chief executive.  
Trump’s executive orders, on border control and other matters, suggest a 
willful, self-absorbed and self-justifying mentality of governance that echoes 
the world of princes and divine right of kings that the Thirty Years’ War 
destroyed. And Wills (2017), drawing on Trump’s obsessive hair styling and 
tweeting, sees something imperial in this President, and not in a flattering sense.  
After those first weeks and over the next few months, the new adminis- 
tration settled into a weekly diet of mishaps, misapprehensions, and “mis- 
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speaking,” a euphemism that even the most serious journalists had shed their 
inhibitions enough to call “lies.” The historian and sometime journalist Niall 
Ferguson wrote in The Sunday Times in Britain that “hysterical academics” 
had missed the point about Trump in drawing as historical references to Hitler, 
Mussolini, while “feverish journalists” leapt to compare him to Nixon and 
Watergate. Trump – whom Ferguson had defended in late stages of the 2016 
campaign – was acting more like Britain’s King George III, under whose 
reign and through whose madness America created its democracy (Ferguson, 
2017).  
The protest marches that followed Trump’s inauguration and executive 
orders, in Washington and many other cities across the country and around 
the world, suggest large parts of the population are not willing to return to a 
notion of governance that accepts any divine right at its core, let alone the 
Machiavellian actions of princes, even if those actions could “make America 
great again.”  
Large parts of American society – Trump’s supporters and those doubtful 
but loyal Republicans who say he is our only President, for now – think 
differently, however. And they may be content, for now. But popular 
dissatisfaction with both the rationalism of Modernism and the complexity 
of Post-modernism isn’t strong enough to usher in a reversion to pre-modern 
governance. Trump’s election may be a big moment in history. Just not that 
big. We can hope so, at least.  
And this: After the frantic first few weeks and months of his Presidency, 
who would accuse the Trump & Co. White House of being a democracy? 
 
First and Second Drafts of History, Revisited 
 
The essay above emerged from my sense of urgency to say something about 
contemporary events. The paper doesn’t fit easily into any category – too 
topical to be academic, too intellectualized to be journalism, too lacking in 
conviction to count as political commentary in today’s shrill debate. It uses 
historical analysis in a contemporary context, filtered through contemporary 
history still relevant through the close associate of the actors in 2011 with 
the occupant of the White House in 2017 (Picard & Garrahan, 2017). This 
essay is neither journalism nor history nor social science, at least in a con- 
ventional sense. It is a piece of writing that seems to have no home, and yet 
is something I felt impelled to put onto at least the digitized form of paper – 
a citizen’s howl about democracy.  
It was a reaction to news and a (first, preliminary, half-digested) account 
of something nonetheless salient (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Democ- 
racy, whatever that means in detail, gives the citizen – me – legitimacy to 
raise matters of concern, a claim warranted by the freedom of speech granted 
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in the First Amendment to the US Constitution. Its power is difficult to 
determine in an era of instant (“fake”?) news and the unending stream of 
words in social media, on television, not to mention in academia. But power 
can be intensified by using such platforms to amplify the message.  
As the verbal decibel count rises, it conveys urgency as well, but the 
urgency itself stems from the sense that something is going very wrong. We 
had better do whatever we citizens, outside the corridors of power, can do to 
keep our social and political systems from running off track. This is the 
salience of citizen journalism, even when this citizen was himself once an 
old-style, traditional journalist.  
Journalism is often called the “first draft of history,” however rough that 
draft might be (Edy, 1999).1 In the old days – a time traditional journalists 
like to recall but with little of the documentation that real historians demand 
– news reporters sought the truth.  
Their – our – mental maps were probably only crude approximations of 
the intellectual terrain they – we – encountered. Perhaps the batteries in their 
– our – search beacons were flat from having consumed too much “juice” 
the night before. Tales from the trenches may go down well in conversations 
around the bar after the newspaper had gone to bed or the newscast was 
finished. But as some of them – us – set off to academia to look more 
seriously into researching social phenomena, many found their – our – 
limited methodologies wanting.  
Social science might be termed the second draft of history, still rough 
around the edges but with digestion at least underway. But social science is 
slow, made slower still by arcane processes of peer review, designed to verify 
the results of empirical tests of positivist assertions, if not always so well 
vitality in argumentation. Meanwhile the escalation of conflict between 
journal publishers over which wins the highest “impact factor” has inten- 
sified, as even relatively low-ranked journals show off their firepower by 
length of their editorial boards and bragging about their rejection rates. 
And yet, social science research faces a counter pressure for speed, for 
making the second draft of history available as soon as possible after the 
first. Journals set time limits for reviewers to issue their judgments – their 
rejections, their revise-and-resubmits, their reject-and-resubmits. As a result 
ideas often bounce through three journals and several years of consideration 
before finding their way, belatedly, into what we used to know as “print.” 
There they rest, destined rarely to be read even when they have been cited.  
These and related dysfunctions in the processes of academic publishing 
have been well discussed in the editorializing of journal editors (e.g. 
Bedeian, 2003, 2004; Byron & Thatcher, 2016; Cloutier, 2016; Davis, 2014, 
2015; Hillman, 2011). The thoughts the Trump essay provoked about it con- 
cern what response an academic should make to this state of affairs in trying 
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to public the second draft of history, when the affairs of state seem so 
pressing.  
One avenue that seems to be opening arises from the editors of those 
journals who worry that “impact factors” are an oxymoron. Many scholars 
care about the disconnect between management research and management 
(Antonacopoulou, 2009; Learmonth, Lockett, & Dowd, 2012; Mirvis, 2014; 
Thorpe, Eden, Bessant, & Ellwood, 2011). In response, journal editors are 
changing their practices.  
For example, among sources of management literature, the Journal of 
Management Inquiry has an occasional feature called “Provocations and 
Provocateurs,” Human Resources Management Journal publishes “Provo- 
cations,” while Strategic Organization has its “SO!apbox.” Writers have to 
earn their way, through a history of scholarly achievement, to be granted the 
license to practice the freedom to think out load in such spaces.  
For those less established, and so perhaps with less of an establishment 
orientation, other vehicles have emerged. Social Science Research Network, 
founded by Michael Jensen of Jensen and Meckling (1976) fame, gave 
scholars a platform, if not quite a soapbox, to experiment with less well-
developed ideas. With the corporate governance scandals of the early years 
of the new century, SSRN quickly became the place where scholars might 
even influence public policy formation before the sloth-like world of academic 
publishing cranked itself into (slow) motion. Purchased by Elsevier/Science 
Direct in 2016, the SSRN experiment could either become mainstream or be 
sapped of its energy and charm. Berkeley Electronic Press offers another 
such forum. And there are more.  
The second draft of history, of at least part of it, is therefore getting faster, 
dragging traditional academic publishing with it, but with what consequences 
for academic debate? Download statistics seem to be creeping into use as a 
metric for academic success, alongside journal league tables and impact 
factors. Yet promotion and tenure (where still available) seem not to depend 
much on promoting oneself through these less conventional means, even as 
we seek “relevance” and real-world “impact.”  
Through technology, an apparatus of power in Foucault’s view of history, 
the “first draft” is now, increasingly, unfiltered at input and filtered by “likes” 
and “shares” upon receipt. It broadens its data while narrowing the data 
available for personal analysis to those that suit the assumptions of those 
seeking to analyze it. Through its own dysfunction, the “second draft” is 
bifurcating into a slow channel seemingly intent on irrelevance and a some- 
what faster one that has not yet learned that for its salience it needs power 
and urgency as well as legitimacy.  
The essay on Trump, Foucault and Pre-Modern Governance is a small 
effort to nudge contemporary political debate onto another line of inquiry. 
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As a homeless essay, however, its lack of power will sap whatever energy 
might come from its urgency and legitimacy. If you found anything in it 
stimulating, think: Where could it find a home?  
In its form – and the many other demarches penned in response to the 
Trump Presidency – it harks back to the days of the essay, to what in the 18th 
century and the founding of the American republic and its Federalist Papers 
were a combined first-and-second draft of history. That was before the 
Enlightenment project took a narrow, empiricist turn and Modernism put on 
its miserablist 20th century cloak (for a critique, see Toulmin, 1992).  
This essay was as its foundation, then, a plea for urgency and argumen- 
tation making reference to, and drawing from, the lessons of thoughtful 
scholarship and scholarly thinking. But it leaves open the question of where 
such essays can find a source of power and how they can find an audience.  
This essay is, therefore, also a plea for more experimentation in scholarly 
work, and a greater willingness to use the tentative conclusions to give 
directions for further, more sober and considered analysis to follow. We might 
increasingly embrace a position that a social scientist like Paul Krugman has 
found in the New York Times or a historian like Niall Ferguson has in The 
Sunday Times in London, where scholarship and journalism meet in per- 
sonalized reflection. In that medium, the personal voice signals authorship 
and authenticity, but not a presumption of having pronounced the final word.  
But those outlets are for the fortunate few and famous. For the rest of us 
with something to say, we need new forms of communication, new journal-
like, journal-lite publications, with new forms of peer review focused on 
attacking with urgency, ideas, and argument, and not just evidence that can 
withstand attack. Those forms of publication could provide room for reflec- 
tion, further tentative iterations of argumentation, before we claim certainty 




1. The origin of the phrase “first, rough draft of history” is somewhat unclear 
(Shafer, 2010). The expression gained currency, however, through Philip Graham, 
publisher of the Washington Post, in many statements, including an article in Public 
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